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I. I NTRODUCTION: F OCUSING ON V OLUNTARINESS TO L IMIT THE U SE OF D ECEPTION
Virtually all interrogations -or at least virtually all successful in terrogations -involve some deception.1 As the United States Supreme Court has placed few limits on the use of deception, the vari ety of deceptive techniques is limited chiefly by the ingenuity of the interrogator. Interrogators still rely on the classic "Mutt and Jeff," or "good cop, bad cop," routine. Interrogators tell suspects that non existent eyewitnesses have identified them, or that still at-large ac complices have given statements against them. Interrogators have been known to put an unsophisticated suspect's hand on a fancy, new photocopy machine and tell him that the "Truth Machine" will know if he is lying. Occasionally, an interrogator will create a piece of evi dence, such as a lab report purporting to link the suspect's bodily flu ids to the victim. Perhaps most often, interrogators lie to create a rap port with a suspect. Interrogators who feel utter revulsion toward suspects accused of horrible crimes sometimes speak in a kindly, solici tous tone, professing to feel sympathy and compassion for the suspect and to feel that the victim, even if a child, should share the blame. At the very least, the successful interrogator deceives the suspect by al lowing the suspect to believe that it somehow will be in the suspect's best interest to undertake the almost always self-defeating course of confessing.
1. As referred to by commentators seeking to limit the use of deceptive interrogation techniques, deception is defined broadly to include everything from express misstatements about the existence of evidence, to the use of false expressions of sympathy for a suspect in order to establish a better rapport.
Because most deception is employed only after the suspect exe cutes a valid waiver of Miranda2 rights, Miranda offers suspects little protection from deceptive interrogation techniques. Thus, commenta tors have increasingly looked to the volllntariness requirement of the Due Process Clause as a basis for limiting these techniques. These commentators have offered a variety of rationales for the voluntari ness requirement -such as equality, dignity, and trust -to justify limiting the use of deception. On close scrutiny, however, none of these rationales provides a sound basis for prohibiting or drastically limiting the use of deception during interrogation. Presumably in rec ognition of the fact that these rationales have somewhat limited reso nance with the Court, with legislators, and with the public at large, some commentators have now focused on the reliability rationale for the voluntariness requirement. A confession is unreliable when the person who gives it actually had nothing to do with the crime to which he purports to confess.
Commentators have sought to show that deception causes many false confessions and, thus, the wrongful convictions of many innocent persons.3 Their efforts have captured the attention not only of the academic community, but also of the popular press.4 Television, news papers, and magazines have reported on individual cases in which de fendants were convicted after giving purportedly false confessions,5 and on the academic studies calling for limits on the use of deception during interrogation.6 Scholars of law and psychology have made sug- [Vol. 99:1168 gestions for curtailing deceptive interrogation techniques.7 While some commentators have concluded that few limits on deception techniques are necessary,8 and a few have advocated prohibiting any interrogation techniques involving deception,9 still others have proposed limits be tween these two extremes.
In order to evaluate these calls for either bans or significant limits on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques, I begin by briefly summarizing the history of the voluntariness requirement to identify its primary policy of preventing unreliable confessions. Next, I critique the rationales for the voluntariness requirement, other than reliability, that have been offered as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation. After concluding that none of these other rationales offers an appro priate basis for the limits, I examine the reliability rationale for the voluntariness requirement, and I find that it does provide the appro priate basis for setting appropriate limits on deceptive interrogation techniques. I then consider the evidence that reliability has been im plicated by the purportedly widespread problem with police-induced false confessions. Finding that the evidence of such false confessions consists entirely of anecdotal accounts, I conclude that the existing evidence falls well short of establishing the significant problem that barred." Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 581, 617 (1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery).
Professor Albert Alschuler has made suggestions similar to those of Professor White. He acknowledges that "[i]n some circumstances, [the police) should be allowed to express false sympathy for the suspect, blame the victim, play on the suspect' s religious feelings, reveal incriminating evidence that in fact exists, confront the suspect with inconsistent statements, and more." Albert W. Alschuler (1996) (proposing that police interrogation be replaced with questioning by a neutral magistrate). But he insists that, in addition to barring threats or promises, courts "should forbid falsifying incriminating evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against a suspect." Alschuler, Constraint, supra at 974.
Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe, the authors of a widely-cited article on false confessions, suggest a different approach. They do not advocate direct limits on the use of interrogation techniques involving deception. Instead, they first suggest that interrogations be videotaped. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Fa lsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENY. U. L. REV. 979, 1120 (1997) ("To further improve interrogation practices and the truth-finding function of the criminal justice system, mandatory taping of interrogations should be adopted.") [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Falsely]. They then suggest that judges evaluate the reliability of a confession be fore admitting it as evidence at trial. See id. at 1118. They would have judges determine reli ability by considering whether the defendant's "post-confession narrative" and the other evidence in the case corroborate the confession. Such evaluations are objectionable, how ever, because they would intrude on the traditional role of the factfinder. Judges do not evaluate other types of evidence -such as witness identifications -to determine whether the evidence is corroborated by other evidence. There is no reason to impose a corrobora tion requirement on statement evidence. See Paul G. Cassell [Vol. 99:1168 has been alleged to exist.1 1 On the other hand, greatly limiting decep tion would impose significant costs on society in terms of reduced numbers of true confessions and reduced convictions of guilty persons.
There is absolutely no question that the conviction of an innocent person because of a false confession is an enormous failing of the criminal justice system. But it does matter whether such occurrences are rare tragedies or a widespread epidemic. Statistically sound stud ies, based on a random sample of confessions to determine how many are false, can and should be done. At this point, however, given the absence of empirical support, the calls for fundamentally changing the way crime is investigated in this country are not justified.
II. D EFINING V OLUNTARINESS

A. The Multi-Factor Totality of the Circumstances Test
The common law originally placed no limits on the methods used to obtain confessions.12 During the 1700s and 1800s, however, judges in both Great Britain and the United States became increasingly con cerned about the reliability of statements obtained by physically abu sive means and began to ask whether confessions were voluntarily given.13 For example, in its 1884 Hopt v. Utah decision, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested that abusive interrogation tactics might re but "the presumption upon which weight is given to [confessions), namely, that one who is innocent will not imperil his safety or prej u dice his interests by an untrue statement."14 Nevertheless, law enforcement personnel continued to employ the "third degree" during interrogation. In 1936, however, with Brown v. Mississippi,15 the Court turned to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for examining the voluntariness of confessions in dozens of state cases. 16 The Court held that police use of violence was "revolting to the sense of justice,"17 stating that "[t)he 11. Thus far, there has been "advocacy research," but not objective "academic re search," on the issue of how frequently false confessions occur. See generally Victor L. Streib, Academic Research and Advocacy Research, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253 (1988).
12. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at 442 (2d ed. 1999).
13. See id. § 6.2, at 440 ("[A] confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear" would be excluded because it "comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it." ( rack and torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand."18 In Brown and other early cases, the Court clearly believed that innocent persons had been convicted, and that their confessions were unreliable.19 Due process required interrogation procedures that would yield voluntary, and therefore reliable, statements. Courts used a "totality of the circumstances" analysis to determine whether "the interrogation was ... unreasonable or shocking, or if the accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational or intelligent choice. "20
The totality of the circumstances test required courts to consider: the conduct and actions of the officers; the physical surroundings of the interrogation; and the characteristics and status of the defendant, including both physical and mental condition.21 Some types of police conduct were deemed so coercive that no examination of the particu lar susceptibilities of the suspect was even necessary.22 Most notably, physical violence and threats, whether implicit23 or explicit, could not be directed against any suspect.24 Physical mistreatment,25 such as ex tended periods of interrogation without intervals for sleep, also pro vided grounds for finding involuntariness.26
The Court's pre-Miranda cases regularly looked to the characteris tics of the particular defendant in deciding whether a confession should be deemed involuntary.27 When the suspect was a juvenile, mentally ill, retarded, or intoxicated, courts required the police to lessen the intensity and duration of the interrogation or reduce the amount of deception. In other cases, however, the courts provided lit- 27. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 322 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (stating, in a case in which a fifteen year-old African-American defendant was arrested for murder and questioned from mid night to 5:00 a.m. by relays of officers, " [t] hat which would leave a man cold and unim pressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens.").
[Vol. 99:1168 tle guidance to police regarding which social, emotional, or mental characteristics were relevant in determining how to interrogate a par ticular suspect.28
Even though reliability was surely uppermost in the Court's mind when it decided Brown v. Mississippi, the Court gave mixed and con fusing signals in subsequent cases about the precise rationale for the voluntariness requirement.29 For example, in Jackson v. Denno,30 the Court referred to a "complex of values" requiring the exclusion of in voluntary confessions. Reliability was just one of these values. Yet, notwithstanding the Court's assertions that there are rationales other than reliability for the voluntariness requirement, reliability still ap pears to be the single most important factor considered by the Court in deciding whether a confession is voluntary.31
B. Courts Place Fe w Limits on the Use of Deception
During an Interrogation
Interrogation typically requires at least some deception -from professing unfelt sympathy for the suspect, to exaggerating the strength of the evidence against the suspect, to falsely alleging that a witness has identified the suspect.32 In the pre-Miranda voluntariness 28. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) , the Court found that police miscon duct was an absolute prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness. Thus, the vulnerabilities of a particular defendant could never alone establish involuntariness.
29. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 112-13 (discussing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1 961)). In Rogers, the Court said that the issue was not reliability but "whether the behavior of the State's Jaw enforcement officials was such as to overbear [defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined -a ques tion to be answered with complete disregard of whether or not [defendant] 20-21 (1980) (during the 1960s, "in 99 cases out of 100," a confession's volun tariness would be determined on the basis of whether the "interrogation methods em ployed ... create[d] a substantial risk that a person subjected to them will falsely confesswhether or not this particular defendant did." (emphasis omitted)); White, Fa lse Confes sions, supra note 10, at 113 ("[I]t still appeared that the probable trustworthiness of a confes sion would be an important factor in determining its admissibility under the due process vol untariness test.").
32. The seminal work on the various types of deception that the police employ during interrogation is contained in the police manual, FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986).
In Professor Leo's "typology of interrogatory deception," he catalogues the most fre quently used interrogation techniques. See Richard A. Leo & Jerome H. Skolnick, Th e Eth ics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3, 5-7 (1992). He included: (1) pre senting interrogations as noncustodial interviews not subject to Miranda; (2) giving the Miranda warnings in a way calculated to downplay their importance; (3) misrepresenting the nature or seriousness of the offense; (4) assuming roles to make manipulative appeals io conscience; (5) misrepresenting the moral seriousness of the offense; (6) using vague and indefinite promises; (7) misrepresenting police identity; and (8) fabricating evidence. Professor Leo's description of deceptive tactics is quite similar to that of the Miranda Court.
cases, the Court characterized the use of deception during interroga tion as just one of the many factors it considered in evaluating the to tality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. For example, in Sp ano v. New York,33 an officer, who was also a close friend of the de fendant, told the defendant that he would get in a lot of trouble if the defendant did not confess. The Court found that the use of the defen dant's childhood friend, who feigned legal and family difficulties to get the defendant to confess, was unconstitutional. Although the Court held that the defendant's statement was involuntary, the use of decep tion was not a dispositive factor.34 In addition to the exploitation of the friendship, the Court's holding relied on the defendant's limited edu cation, his emotional instability, his great fatigue, the pressure used by the interrogating officers over many hours, his requests for an attor ney, and his requests to remain silent. 35 Although the Miranda Court appeared to take a negative view of deceptive interrogation techniques, the Court imposed few limits on their use. By detailed reference to police training manuals, the Court took note of widely used techniques, such as "good cop, bad cop" rou tines and false lineup identification techniques, and observed that the techniques created or increased the disadvantage most suspects had in matching wits with their interrogators.36 Instead of forbidding such techniques, however, the Court protected suspects by requiring that police inform suspects of their rights to remain silent and to be pro vided with an attorney before commencing custodial interrogation.37 Miranda was the high-water mark of the Court's negative view of in terrogation in general and deceptive interrogation in particular. 34. The Court stated that it deserved mentioning, in the totality of the circumstances inquiry, that one of the officers who questioned the defendant was a childhood friend, who falsely represented to the defendant that he would be in trouble ifthe defendant did not con fess. Id. at 323.
35. See id. at 321-23 (noting that the cumulation of these factors amounted to "official pressure" that overwhelmed the defendant's will).
36. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448-58 (listing various types of police deception and ob serving that they could take a "heavy toll on individual liberty").
37
. Miranda does limit the use of deception in obtaining a waiver of rights or in re sponding to requests to invoke the rights. Once the police obtain a valid waiver, however, and absent any express invocations of the right to silence or counsel, Miranda leaves the po lice free to use almost any deceptive tactic. The Court has directly considered the propriety of deception only once. In Frazier v. Cupp,39 the police misrepresented the strength of their case against the defendant. They falsely told the defendant that his cousin, who had been with him on the night of the crime, had con fessed.40 The Court considered the fact of this deception relevant to, but not dispositive of, the voluntariness issue. The Court has repeat edly declined the opportunity to place any specific limits on the use of deception during interrogation. 41 In 1986, while considering lies made to an attorney, the Court, in Moran v. Burbine, did acknowledge that some police deception might be so "egregious" that it could rise to the "level of a due process viola tion."42 Yet the Court neither provided examples of such unacceptable police conduct, nor suggested that the police needed to be particularly careful about using deception during interrogation. Instead, the Moran Court emphasized that society has a "legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt,"43 and that " 'the need for po lice questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws' cannot be doubted. 48. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 781 ("The message to the police is that, as far as the law is concerned, they have virtual carte blanche to engage in deceptive undercover work."); Young, supra note 9, at 451 ("With no absolute prohibition of police lying during interroga tion, courts today are free to condone such lying.").
Courts 51. In considering the reliability rationale for the due process voluntariness require ment, a court does not ask whether a confession should be deemed reliable given all of the evidence in the case, other than the confession. Instead, a court must ask whether a govern ment procedure, such as the use of a particular form of deception, generally creates an un due risk that an innocent person will falsely confess. See White, Involuntary Confession, su pra note 10, at 2022 ("[T)he Court's Due Process confession cases have always focused on the propriety of the officers' interrogation methods rather than the resulting confessions.").
52. See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 6.2, at 456-59.
53. See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (stating that confessions ob tained through coercion are contrary to "the 'strongly felt attitude of our society that impor tant human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government ... wrings a confession out of an accused against his will'" (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960))). The Court has appeared to characterize some police methods, conduct, or behav ior, as so offensive or improper, that they are barred even if the reliability of the resulting confession does not appear to be in question. See statements about which police behavior will not be tolerated in a fair system, often still reflect, at bottom, a concern with reliability.54
Ill. P ROPOSED R EASONS, B EYOND R ELIABILITY, FOR L IMITING D ECEPTION
Some of the proposed limits on deceptive interrogation are based on rationales for the voluntariness requirement other than reliability. To evaluate the worth of the proposed limits, it is necessary to con sider the asserted rationales.
A. Equality Between Suspect and Interrogator:
"Fox-Hunter" Rationale
The "fox-hunter,'' "fair chance,'' or "sporting theory" rationale for limiting police deception during interrogation provides that deception gives the interrogator so much of an advantage that the suspect has no real chance to avoid confessing.55 The argument is that the suspect is entitled to some assistance in resisting the powerfully persuasive ap peals of the interrogator to confess. The notion of creating some parity between the suspect and his interrogator was evident in Miranda's treatment of suspects as victims.56 References to the sporting theory 54. In his seminal 1963 article on the Court's involuntary confession cases, Professor Yale Kamisar described the cases as decided based on two reliability standards. The first standard considered whether the confession of the particular defendant, given that defen dant's individual characteristics, might be unreliable. The second standard considers whether the police tactic might make some innocent defendant confess, even if there was no concern about the reliability of the instant confession. See Yale Kamisar, Wh at Is an Involuntary Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 755 (1963) . A tactic that would never cause an inno cent person to confess falsely will rarely be deemed by the Court so outrageous as to be con stitutionally barred.
Under this theory:
The fox is to have a fa ir chance for his life: he must have (so close is the analogy) what is called law: leave to run a certain length of way, for the express purpose of giving him a chance for escape. While under pursuit, he must not be shot: it would be as unfair as con victing him of burglary on a hen-roost, in five minutes' time, in a court of conscience. [Vol. 99:1168 are even more pronounced, however, in the work of commentators critical of police interrogation.57
The sporting view or fox-hunter rationale for limiting deception should be rejected. It is not in society's interest to give the suspect and the officer an equal chance to prevail in an interrogation. Society is not indifferent as to who wins the hunt.58 There is no reason, constitu tional or otherwise, that guilty defendants deserve an opportunity to avoid prosecution or conviction.59 Interrogation is not a game in which a suspect matches wits with the police. Law enforcement should be encouraged to build the strongest possible case against a defendant, and one of law enforcement's goals is to solve a crime by obtaining a confession from the wrongdoer. Moreover, other types of evidence are not excluded or limited simply because they make conviction more likely. For example, DNA, fingerprint, and videotape evidence can be even more damning than a confession. Yet no one suggests that by collecting such evidence and introducing it at trial the police create some unfair inequality between the police and the defendant. Nor do we suggest that such powerful evidence makes a trial futile for the de fendant because it creates such a strong case for the prosecution. The community benefits when a case is strong, and when a guilty defen dant either pleads guilty or is convicted by being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. Equality Among Suspects: Th e Equal Protection Rationale
The "equal protection" rationale for limiting interrogation ad dresses the purported problem that some criminals are smarter, more sophisticated, or more able to resist the pleas of interrogators to con fess than are other criminals. Stated in a favorable light, the equal pro tection rationale means only that all suspects should be equally aware 59. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 32 ("What earned the fair chance ar gument Bentham's derisive fox-hunter's label was its suggestion that, as an end in itself, even guilty defendants should have a fair chance for acquittal."); George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 812 (1995) ("Noth ing -not even the tired cliche that the United States has an accusatorial and not an inquisi torial system of justice -will make [the fox-hunter] argument work once it is exposed as a call to give guilty suspects a better chance at acquittal." (reviewing GRANO, supra)).
of their rights.6() But when this rationale is viewed more expansively, it means that foolish, ignorant, and unsophisticated suspects must be given the same chance as experienced, knowledgeable suspects to re sist interrogation.61
Proponents of the equal protection rationale have stated that it is "unseemly for government officials systematically to seek out and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a ci�izen."62 Such a view may have some validity when applied to truly mentally impaired individuals. But if psychological vulnerabilities are meant to include anything that makes a person more likely to confess -from a moder ately low I.Q. to a docile personality -than the propriety of interro gating almost any suspect is doubtful. Although the Due Process Clause may require some additional protections for particularly young or impaired suspects, it surely does not protect the foolish and unso phisticated criminal from himself. In fact, society benefits because some suspects confess. 63 Because Miranda guarantees that all suspects are aware of their rights, there is no need to further equalize suspects' ability or inclina tion to invoke those rights and prevent interrogations. There is no doubt that a foolish or unsophisticated suspect is far more likely to confess than is a strong, smart, sophisticated suspect. But this logical occurrence should not be troubling. The foolish suspect is also more likely to consent to a search, to leave fingerprints and other clues at the crime scene, to be slow or noisy, or to speak loosely to new ac quaintances who may be undercover officers. The community is pleased when any of these things happen because the criminal is more likely to be caught. Therefore, we should not be troubled when the suspect's folly leads him to confess when questioned.
60. See Caplan, supra note 58, at 1456 ("Suspects who do not know their rights, or do not assert them, as a consequence of some handicap -poverty, lack of education, emotional instability -should not, it is felt, fare worse than more accomplished suspects who know and have the capacity to assert their rights."). 62. Schulhofer, supra note 61 , at 872. 63. Thomas, supra note 59, at 812 (noting that calls for equal treatment in the interroga tion room "is like saying that because the police do not solve white-collar crimes as often as crimes of violence, the State should release from custody some of the robbers and mug gers").
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C. Trust Rationale
Some commentators have urged limits on deceptive interrogation techniques in order to "facilitate trust relationships between suspects and government [interrogators] ."64 In fact, one commentator has ar gued that the primary purpose of interrogation is not to solve crimes, but rather to establish the interrogator's integrity and to elicit the sus pect's trust.65 Interrogation is not, however, a civics lesson for criminal suspects.66 Interrogation is a critical information-gathering tool in law enforcement's arsenal for solving crimes and protecting the public. Arguments based on the trust rationale ignore the chief purpose of in terrogation and the practical realities of law enforcement. Moreover, the trust rationale would require a ban on all undercover investigation. The basis of the trust rationale is that harm occurs when the suspect learns that the police lied to him during interrogation. Yet the suspect in an undercover operation will be similarly harmed by learning that an undercover agent's very identity was a lie.
There is no real support for the claim that suspects would be more likely to confess to an officer whom they trusted.67 In addition, sus pects do not expect complete honesty from law enforcement person nel. Complete honesty would require an officer to inform a suspect that it is most certainly not in the suspect's best interest to confess and that the suspect would be best served by invoking his rights to silence and counsel.68 64. Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6, 62 (1995) (noting that the lack of rules restricting lies creates an atmosphere in which the government is expected to lie and manipulate); see also Young, supra note 9, at 457-61; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 41 (interrogation about "gar den variety crimes, such as petty theft and income tax evasion, [results in] an unhealthy at mosphere of resentment and distrust").
65. Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 (asserting that an important police objective of interrogation is to "provide important opportunities for police to distribute information to suspects (and more indirectly, the public) about such things as integrity, honest dialogue, and trustworthiness"); Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 65 (asserting that "we might sensibly con clude that facilitating trust between individuals and their governments ... is an important goal to which the truth-seeking function sometimes must submit.").
66. See, e.g., Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 6 ("[W]e should want to make interrogation a particularly meaningful encounter for the suspect -one in which the values of trust and trustworthiness are taught by the interrogator's own example -regardless of whether a con fession ensues .... " ); see also Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 70 (" [W] hat is proper behavior between government and residents will closely resemble what is proper behavior in analo gous relationships among private individuals .... " ).
67. Young, supra note 9, at 455-68.
68. Professor Paris contends that suspects who are lied to and then convicted will re member the lie when they are released, be resentful about it, and be less likely to act as up standing citizens. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 830-31. Yet suspects who are not lied to may very well not confess, not be convicted, and will suffer no incarceration or other penalty for their wrong-doing. This unpunished, at-large criminal is certainly no more likely to be an upstanding citizen because he was not lied to by the police. Although he may have feelings of trust for the honest officers, he is just as likely to feel contempt towards them for their inability to apprehend and prosecute him for his wrong-doing.
According to the trust rationale, breaches of trust ultimately deter confessions because the resentful "suspect or defendant today may be the witness tomorrow."69 There is no evidence, however, that wit nesses have refused to talk to the police because the police are not al ways truthful in talking to suspects. Witnesses have many reasons not to cooperate with the police. For example, witnesses may be unwilling to make court appearances for fear that a defendant will retaliate. In addition, most people are already aware, if only from television, that the police lie during interrogation. There has been no showing that citizens have responded to this police ingenuity by declining to report crimes, assist in investigations, or testify as witnesses. Even if it were true that breaches of trust deterred confessions in the long-run, the police may legitimately feel that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush." When the police suspect a person of a particular, already committed crime, it is not worth forgoing deception, on the off-chance that the suspect might be a useful witness to some other person's fu ture crime.
D . Dignity Rationale
In advocating limits on police interrogation, some commentators refer to a concern for the individual's "dignity."70 According to these commentators, "pressuring a suspect to answer questions is unduly cruel, violating the idea of the basic dignity of all individuals,"71 and "[i]nterrogation tactics that are calculated to make the suspect feel that he is not a decent or honorable person unless he confesses consti tute direct assaults upon [his] dignity."72 The dignity concern would appear to invalidate most interrogation. Both commentators for73 and against74 substantial limits on interrogation refer to a need to respect individual dignity. Nevertheless, acknowledgement of this need does not translate easily into rules that distinguish acceptable and unac ceptable interrogation practices.
69. Young, supra note 9, at 458.
70. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 40-41 (arguing that deceiving suspects does not accord with dignity and autonomy).
71. Paris, Trust, supra note 9, at 48 n.153; see also Rosenberg & Rosenberg, supra note 9, at 76-77 (asserting that Miranda "reflects the ages-old tension between preservation of human dignity and solution of crimes."); Thomas S. Schrock et al., lnterrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 42 n.174 (1978) (citing Miranda's as sumption that the constitutional basis of the privilege is the "respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens").
72. White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 628 (stating that "criminal suspects have a right to be treated in a manner that reflects a concern of their dignity as human beings").
73. See, e.g., id. at 627-28; Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 51 (suggesting that police inter rogation be replaced with questioning by a magistrate).
74. See GRANO, CONFESSIONS, supra note 55, at 22 ("[N]otions of human dignity pro vide limits on what government may do to solve crime.").
E. Morality Rationale
Some commentators have asserted moral limits on interrogation techniques.75 In particular, a number of these commentators76 have taken cues from the work of moral philosopher Sissela Bok. Bok has examined the justifications for lying throughout the whole range of human interactions.77 She details the harms that lying can cause, but concludes that lying is morally justified when there is no alternative, or when the lie results in greater benefits than costs.78 Thus, Bok finds that lying to one's "enemies" is justified. She does not specifically deal with the matter of interrogation, but she does allow that criminals could be considered "enemies."79
Reliance on morality as a basis for limiting deceptive interrogation practices requires two assumptions: 1) that lying and deception are clearly an evil within the everyday relationships of citizens; and, 2) that expectations about everyday relationships should also apply dur ing the questioning of criminal suspects. Both of these assumptions should be questioned. First, even apart from police questioning, in the normal course of affairs among citizens, deception cannot be painted as an unmitigated evil. In fact, deceptions large and small are an ac-75. See, e.g. , Greenawalt, supra note 61, at 17 (concluding that the right to silence is "morally justified"). But see State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 250-51 (N.J. 1968) ("It is con sonant with good morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal's ignorance or stupidity in the detectional process. This must be so if Government is to succeed in its primary mission to protect the first right of the individual to live free from criminal attack.").
76. See Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 819; Slobogin, supra note 8, at 777 (confirming that his article principally relies on Sissela Bok's philosophical work); Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833, 833 (1997) ("I interpret Bok's approval of deception as further removed from authorizing the deceptive investigative practices considered by Professor Slobogin than he does."); Al schuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85 (citing Bok to assert that lying "raises deon tological concerns that should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders of deceptive interrogation").
77. See SiSSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978) (discussing whether there are such things as justifiable lies and the circumstances in which they would occur).
78. See id. at 97, 114-29 (advising an evaluation of the alternatives, consequences, and effects of lying).
79. See id. at 141-53; Commentators have reached widely divergent conclusions on whether Bok's theories permit the regular use of deception during interrogation. The differ ent views arise because of disagreement over when a criminal suspect should be deemed an enemy within Bok's theory. Compare Paris, Lying, supra note 47, 817, 819-20 (relying on Bok to find virtually all deception prohibited), with Slobogin, supra note 8, at 806 (relying on Bok to find that suspects are "enemies" and can be lied to once they are held pursuant to a probable cause determination). Professor Mosteller suggests "the most appropriate reading of [Bok's] work is that the declared-enemies category applies only to a small subset of crimi nal defendants ... and not to the typical investigation of past individual criminal conduct." Mosteller, supra note 76, at 834. Professor Alschuler suggests that the concerns raised by reference to Bok's theories "should at least cast the burden of justification on the defenders of deceptive interrogation." Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 974 n.85. cepted part of life -from enthusiastic sales pitches to polite greetings and comments. 80 Second, the rules and expectations governing discourse between citizens does not necessarily apply to police questioning of criminal suspects. Given society's interest in catching criminals, lying during in terrogation can be justified as an appropriate means toward achieving this important social end. Thus, conduct by the police towards a crimi nal suspect cannot be judged by reference to what is morally worthy during interactions between family members, friends, neighbors, and acquaintances.
F. Pragmatic Concerns
In contrast to principled criteria for limiting deceptive interroga tion practices, commentators have also advanced pragmatic reasons offered for limiting deception during interrogation. The chief prag matic reason is the slippery slope argument that permitting lying dur ing interrogation leads to widespread police lying in other contexts, including warrants, affidavits, and sworn testimony.81 Some officers, like some civilian witnesses, do lie under oath. But we assume that or dinary people -such as witnesses, jurors, and even defendants -un derstand the significance of the oath. Similarly, police officers know, and should be expected to know, what is appropriate and lawful dur ing the many different duties they perform -undercover agent, beat officer, interrogator, affiant, and witness.82 
Id.
In moral terms, the most reasonable explanation for this behavior is that people make dis tinctions, based on the relative harmfulness of telling the truth versus dissembling, on whether the false statement is defensive or offensive, or on whether the motivation is selfish or altruistic. Whether the conduct is wrong, and if so how much, depends on context.
81. See, e.g., Leo & Skolnick, supra note 32, at 9 ("When police are permitted to lie in the interrogation context, why should they refrain from lying to judges when applying for warrants, from violating internal police organization rules against lying, or from lying in the courtroom?"); Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 829 (" [L] ying in the interrogation context may lead to police perjury under oath."); Young, supra note 9, at 463 (asserting that lying during interrogation will teach officers to become accomplished liars, and suggesting that officers may lie to obtain an adrenaline rush).
82.
Commentators raising these evidentiary concerns have not addressed the matter of either undercover investigations or the use of ruses during searches. The dangers alleged to arise from deceptive interrogation would seem just as likely, if not more likely, to arise from the deceptions used during undercover operations or as ruses to search. If officers can be relied on to understand the line between undercover operations and sworn testimony, they are equally able to distinguish between interrogation and sworn testimony.
There is one pragmatic concern that has caused a court to exclude a confession because of the use of a deceptive interrogation technique. In the 1989 case of Florida v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (1989), the state court held that there is a distinct difference between acceptable verbal deception and fabrication of scientific documentation, which has the potential to reach the courtroom. Cayward specifically held that the police should not have created a [Vol. 99:1168
G. Criticism of the Non-reliability Rationales fo r Limiting In terrogation Techniques
Many of the rationales offered for limiting deceptive interrogation techniques, if taken to their logical extreme, would bar not only decep tive interrogation techniques, but other investigative methods as well. Commentators have failed to explain adequately why deception must be barred or substantially limited during interrogation, while the de ception used in other areas -such as undercover investigations, wire taps, ruses, and informants -may continue.83 A bar on deception during all stages of investigation would make it very difficult to solve some crimes.84
Some commentators suggesting limits on interrogation techniques appear most concerned with whether a technique is effective in elicit ing confessions. Yet effectiveness is an inappropriate basis for limiting interrogation. The voluntariness requirement does not bar effective interrogation, or even reflect a general hostility to the concept of po lice interrogation.85 "Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are infalse lab report purporting to connect semen found on the five-year-old rape and murder victim to the nineteen-year-old suspect. Id. Relying on Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), the court acknowledged that verbal deception does not render a confession involuntary. The court, however, distinguished deception by false documents. 552 So. 2d at 975. The court concluded that there was an unacceptably high risk that such false evidence used during in terrogation would somehow be included in the file and later considered true evidence at trial. Id. at 975 (suggesting that the heavy caseload of courts may allow manufactured docu ments to be used as substantive evidence against the defendant). Although this is a danger that should be addressed by appropriate police and prosecution procedures, the Cayward court's wholesale bar on documentary deception is overbroad.
83. See Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 679 (acknowledging that wiretaps and informants are no more respectful of a suspect's dignity than police interrogations). Despite the wide variety of rationales proffered for the voluntari ness requirement, scholars have increasingly emphasized the reliability rationale.88 Under the reliability rationale, a court must ask whether the procedure used to obtain a confession creates an unreasonable risk that an innocent person would falsely confess.89
According to many of these scholars, empirical evidence shows that deceptive interrogation practices cause a significant number of false confessions.90 Because the reliability rationale focuses on pro tecting innocent suspects, it offers a more palatable -and appropriate -reason for limiting interrogation.91 The increased scholarly empha- 87. Compare, e.g. , White, Police Trickery, supra note 10, at 613-23 (1979) (focusing on a concern that guilty suspects would make an irrational or poor choice about the desirability of confessing), with White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 105 (emphasizing the risk of false confessions and the reliability rationale for the voluntariness requirement).
88. See, e.g. , Alschuler, supra note 10, at 975 (including reliability as the chief reason for advocating limits on the use of deception); White, Fa lse Confessions, supra note 10, at 138-42 (discussing the constitutional basis and the formulation of procedural safeguards); Young, supra note 9, 461 (including reliability as one basis for a broad argument against lying).
89. There are obvious parallels between the increased focus on reliability by critics of police interrogation and the growing "innocence movement" by opponents of the death penalty. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 110 (arguing that "the empirical evidence shows that standard interrogation techniques are likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions in a significant number of cases").
91. See Mosteller, supra note 76, at 837 ("[C]hanges in the law that increase procedural protections are practical possibilities if they have a greater probability of protecting the in nocent. This point dovetails with the reality of popular societal reaction and contemporary press coverage: not surprisingly, it will be abuses of authority involving innocent people that will likely provoke restrictions on investigative deception, and restrictions that are more likely to prevent abuses affecting the innocent are, relatively speaking, more politically vi able."). olice-induced false confessions are a seri ous problem for the American criminal justice system" because "con fessions by the innocent still occur regularly."94 They assert that "police-induced false confessions occur often and are highly likely to lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution, conviction, and/or incarcera tion of the innocent."95 They further claim that contemporary psycho logical methods are "apt to cause an innocent person to confess,"96 and that "[w]hen police interrogate suspects whose guilt is a mere possi bility rather than a reasonable likelihood, they run a significant risk of 1209, 1209 n.4 (1980) ("Those who have sought to limit police interrogation believe that interrogation, often carried out in secret, involves coercion, and often yields false confessions."). Yet he also concedes that "(t)here are only a small number of documented cases in which standard interrogation methods have led to indis putably false confessions." White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131.
[Vol. 99:1168 trustworthy,"103 and that "standard interrogation methods precipitate a significant number of false confessions."104 These repeated and widely-reported assertions that "contemporary psychological methods" are "apt" to cause an innocent suspect to con fess are verifiable and should be verified. 105 Yet, thus far, no one has undertaken the research necessary to prove the claims.106
Empirical Data on Fa lse Confessions Is Limited
These alarming claims that false confessions are widespread do not hold up under scrutiny. Although there are reports -in both the aca demic and popular press -about individual instances of purportedly false confessions, there is no sound empirical proof that such instances are widespread.107 Thus far, the reports have failed to rebut the intui tive view108 that the number of persons incarcerated because of police induced false confessions is quite small.
The existing research is almost entirely anecdotal and focuses on the causes, not the scope, of the problem. Sweeping references to sig nificant, substantial, and widespread instances of false confessions are supported by reference to perhaps a few dozen indisputably false con fessions. To justify the claim that the false confession problem is wide spread, the new research will need to be based on a statistically signifi cant, randomly-drawn sample of persons who gave confessions during interrogation. To determine whether there is a substantial concern that any of the confessors may actually be innocent, researchers would 103. White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. Yet he also concludes that it is "impossible to estimate" the "number of false confessions," White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2039, and that "there are only a small number of documented cases in which standard interrogation methods have led to indisputably false confessions." White, Fa lse Confessions, supra note 10, at 131. 104. White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2042; see also White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("Over the past two decades, a significant number of sus pects have claimed that standard interrogation techniques have led them to give false con fessions.").
105.
Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess Fa lsely, supra note 10, at 983.
106. See id. at 1135 (acknowledging that there has been no research "to quantify the number and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriages of justice").
107. See Cassell, Balanced Approaches, supra note 7, at 1125-26 (stating that "the em pirical linchpin" for the proposals of Ofshe, Leo, and Alschuler "is simply missing"). Despite the spirited, on-going debate about police interrogation and confessions, there are surpris ingly few studies of confession evidence. See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM ix (1993) ("[I]n contrast to the massive num bers of eyewitness studies, the topic of confession evidence has been almost completely ig nored by psychologists and other social scientists.").
108. See White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 108 ("The idea that a suspect, who is neither insane nor the victim of physical coercion, will confess to a crime he did not com mit seems counterintuitive.").
need to examine all available evidence, starting with the court records. It appears that no one has attempted such statistically sound research on false confessions. To justify substantial limits on the ability of the police to solve crimes by interrogating suspects, two questions must be answered: 1) why do some suspects falsely confess; and 2) how many false confes sions are actually given. The first question, why a person would falsely confess, must be answered to determine whether limiting certain po lice conduct would even have the effect of preventing false confessors from confessing. For example, if most false confessors are like the de fendant in Colorado v. Connelly,110 who confessed independently of police action, then there is no point in limiting police conduct. Even if the research should establish that police conduct can cause false con fessions, we cannot decide whether to limit that conduct without an swering the second question on how often the conduct causes false confessions. Although there is a fair bit of research on the first ques tion -why a person might falsely confess111 -there is absolutely none that adequately answers the second question -how often this phenomenon takes place. Advocates of limits on interrogation tactics fail to make the critical distinction between research on why anyone might falsely confess and how often suspects actually make false con fessions. odern psychology has come a long way towards a more complex and sophisticated un derstanding of the interplay of factors to leading to false confessions," but deeming "unan swerable" how many people would falsely confess during interrogation).
Professors Leo and
[Vol. 99:1168 At best, the existing research has shown: 1) that certain interroga tion techniques are more likely than other techniques to result in false confession; and 2) that certain types of people -such as juveniles and the mentally impaired -appear somewhat more likely than the aver age suspect to give a false confession. The research has not demon strated, however, how often the techniques in question result in false confessions, nor what number of suspects in these more vulnerable groups give false confessions. The fact that persons in these vulnerable groups appear to be over-represented in the few false confession cases that have been collected and examined does not demonstrate that per sons in these groups give false confessions at a substantial rate. The existing research is interesting, but it provides no basis for imposing limits on the current practice of using deception during interrogation.
Commentators asserting that there is a widespread, significant problem with false confessions have relied primarily on three scholarly works: 1) the 1987 Bedau-Radelet study of 350 purportedly erroneous convictions in potentially capital cases since 1900;112 2) the 1998 Leo Ofshe study of sixty post-Miranda cases involving purportedly false confessions; and, 3) Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson's 1992 book on the causes and types of false confessions.113 These works suggest only why an in nocent person might falsely confess, 114 not how many people actually do falsely confess. 
GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY (1992).
See, e.g., Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 972-73 (citing Gudjonsson); Thomas, supra note 93, at 350 (citing only Bedau and Radelet as support for the assertion that police-induced false confessions are "common").
Many commentators also refer to the much earlier work of Edward Borchard, which presents sixty-five cases of purportedly wrongful convictions of innocent persons. See BORCHARD, supra note 9; see, e.g. , Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 433 n.7. Borchard acknowledged that only a very few of these sixty-five cases involved false confes sions. He found that the causes or alleged error were "in the main, mistaken identification, circumstantial evidence (from which erroneous inferences are drawn), or perjury, or some combination of these factors." BORCHARD, supra, at viii.
Commentators also refer to two other books: JEROME FRANK AND BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957) The widely-cited study by Professors Bedau and Radelet does not examine any randomly drawn sample of cases. Instead, Professors Bedau and Radelet collected 350 cases from the many thousands de cided in this century when the defendant received or could have re ceived a capital sentence. Although they concluded that the confession was false in forty-nine of these cases, they acknowledge that few, if any, of these forty-nine allegedly false confessions were caused by po lice deception. As they explain, some of the confessions were "the re sult of mental illness;" one defendant confessed "as a joke;" and an other claimed to have confessed "to · impress his girlfriend."115 In selecting and describing just forty-nine cases of allegedly false confes sions from the thousands of capital or potentially capital cases decided in this century, Professors Bedau and Radelet provide no support for the claim that false confessions are widespread. Their research is of particularly limited use in evaluating interrogation techniques used now, because they included so many cases from the earlier part of the century, when both discrimination against minority suspects and the use of physical abuse against all suspects were far more common.116
In their 1998 study of false confessions, Professors Leo and Ofshe presented a collection of sixty cases, selected from the many hundreds of thousands of confession cases decided after Miranda, in which they believed the confessions were false. As they acknowledge, those sixty cases "do not constitute a statistically adequate sample of false confes sion cases. "117 Thus, their study focused not on the number of false "makes this choice to escape an experience that for him has always been excessively stressful or one that has be come intolerably punishing because it has gone beyond the bounds of a legally proper interrogation." Id. at 997. Within the context of the legal doctrine about vol untariness, the "stress-compliant" false.confessor just seems like another way of saying that the physical and psychological pressures are so great that an innocent person would confess. The existing law, under the totality of the circumstances test for voluntariness, would almost surely bar any such pressures that would make an innocent person confess.
The second type, the coerced-compliant false confessor, confesses "(i)n response to clas sically coercive interrogation techniques such as threats of harm and/or promises of leni ency .... " Id. at 998. The third type, the persuaded false confessor, confesses after becoming convinced that it is more likely than not that he committed the crime, despite possessing no memory of having done so. Id. at 999 ("A non-coerced persuaded false confession is elicited when an investigator relies on routine influence techniques of interrogation, whereas a co erced-persuaded false confession is elicited when threats, promises, or other legally coercive interrogation techniques are added to this mix.").
Professor White categorizes false confessions similarly but uses only two categories. The "coerced-compliant" confession occurs when "a suspect knows he is confessing falsely but confesses in order to obtain some goal or 'escape from a stressful or an intolerable situa tion' .... " White, False Confessions, supra note 10, at 109 (quoting GUDJONSSON, supra note 113, at 228). "Coerced-internalized" confessions occur when a "suspect comes to be lieve in his own guilt." Id. 121. The one study that concludes that there are a large number of wrongful convictions of innocent persons, and at least suggests that some portion of these many cases might be due to false confessions, is utterly flawed. See C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 2 CRIME & DELINQ. 518 (1986). In 1986, Professors Huff, Rattner, and Sagarin asserted that a "conservative estimate" of the number of wrongful convictions of innocent persons each year was 6,000. They arrived at this num ber without assembling a random sample or examining any case files. Instead, they obtained a figure for the frequency of wrongful convictions by surveying the opinions of 177 persons involved in the criminal justice system, from sheriffs to judges to public defenders. It is hardly clear why all of these people were deemed to know a figure that most other research ers assert is either elusive or unknowable.
The survey was both framed and interpreted in a highly misleading manner. Respon dents were asked to estimate the number of wrongful convictions. They were given only the following choices as possible answers: Never, Less than 1 %, 1-5%, 6-10%. Because just one case of wrongful conviction would have to exclude the answer "never," not surprisingly, few respondents gave that answer. Also hardly surprising was the fact that the overwhelming majority of the respondents chose the next lowest category offered as a choice, "Less than 1 %." Of course, the category of all estimates "Less than 1 %" but greater than zero is quite broad. It includes estimates as high as 1 out of 101 as well as estimates of 1 in 1000, 1 in 10,000, 1 in 100,000, and, in fact, every barely perceptible estimate as long as it is higher than zero. Thus, the construction of the survey question should have allowed the researchers to reach almost no conclusion about the estimates by the respondents. Yet the researchers de cided to simply take the mid-point of their very broad range and settled on an estimate of one-half of 1 % or 1 in 200. They then multiplied this quite high rate of error by an enormous figure representing the number of convictions in this country each year for serious crimes. Thus, they were able to arrive at an alarmingly large number -6,000 -of purportedly produced credible evidence that there is a serious problem that should be addressed by substantially limiting police efforts to obtain confes sions.122 b. Inclusion of Cases Without Convictions. The existing studies are also weakened by the inclusion of persons who gave false confessions but who were never brought to trial and convicted. For example, in the Leo-Ofshe collection of sixty cases involving false confessions, only 29 of the cases involved a person who was actually convicted after making a false confession.123 In the remaining cases, the criminal jus tice system successfully identified the unreliability of the confessions at some point before conviction. Instances in which the system worked as it is supposed to -by weeding out false confessions before an er roneous conviction -do not provide a sound basis for drastically lim iting police efforts to obtain confessions from all suspects, many of whom are guilty of serious offenses.124 Thus, researchers should focus on those instances of allegedly false confessions in which the defen dant has exhausted his appeals.
c. Inappropriate Sources to Establish Innocence. To verify a wrongful conviction, it is necessary to determine whether a convicted person is, in fact, innocent. Actual innocence is a certainty in only a small fraction of the cases that researchers have used to illustrate the wrongful convictions. This number, however, is based on a completely speculative assump tion that the respondents were reporting estimates of 1 in 200, rather than much lower esti mates.
This sleight of hand with statistics tells us very little about how many wrongful convic tions actually occurred, or even much about what the 177 respondents believe. In conducting surveys about matters that may be quite rare, survey questions must be carefully crafted to allow for answers that reveal the true rarity of the matter being studied.
122. Even while asserting that there is a significant false confession problem, some commentators have acknowledged that there are, in fact, few documented cases. See, e.g. , White, Involuntary Confession, supra note 10, at 2043 (recognizing that "a court might con clude that the empirical data" on the false confession problem is "tentative and fragmen tary"). Professors Leo and Ofshe, tacitly acknowledging that their list of cases falls well short of establishing that false confessions happen regularly, assert that "it is reasonable to assume that the reported cases represent only the proverbial tip of the false confession iceberg." Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1139. No such assumption is reasonable. The actual frequency of false confessions should be established by studying a random sample of confession cases and not by speculation based largely on isolated cases reported in the me dia.
123. See Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 90, at 473.
124. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 536. ("If a person who has made a false confession is not convicted -because the police do not arrest, the prosecutor does not indict, or the jury does not convict -then the screens in the system have at least worked to prevent the ultimate miscarriage of justice, the conviction of an innocent per son."); see also Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Ey ewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 408 (1987) ("A misidentified defendant who goes to trial un doubtedly runs a terrible risk of being convicted in error, but it does not take blind faith in trials by jury to believe that the risk is considerably smaller than it is for a guilty defendant and that this highly imperfect filter reduces the number of erroneous convictions considera bly.").
[Vol. 99:1168 problem of wrongful convictions in general and false confessions in particular. Innocence is most clearly and easily established by the criminal justice system itself, when it overturns convictions on grounds of innocence. Actual innocence is unequivocally established, for ex ample, when a court overturns a confessor's conviction because DNA evidence establishes that the defendant did not commit the crime. There are few cases, however, involving judicial determinations of wrongful convictions in cases of purportedly false confessions. In fact, many of the persons whom scholars have labeled as innocent are still in prison because no judge has agreed with the researchers' and de fendant's claims of innocence.
The methodology used to establish the innocence of convicted per sons raises significant concerns. Because there are so few judicial de terminations of actual innocence, researchers have looked for other evidence demonstrating innocence. They have made some claims of innocence based, at least in part, on questionable information such as newspaper assertions and the defendant's own claims of innocence.125
The reliance on questionable sources to establish innocence is ap parent, for example, in the Bedau-Radelet study of 350 cases of pur portedly wrongful convictions. Professors Bedau and Radelet assert that, in these cases, the defendant was subsequently "found to be in nocent" of the capital or potentially capital crime for which he was convicted.126 The phrase "found to be innocent" would seem to suggest that there was a judicial or other official determination of innocence. In fact, for some of the cases, the finding of innocence is a conclusion reached by Professors Bedau and Radelet. Many of the defendants deemed innocent by them actually served their sentences or remain imprisoned because the courts made no such finding of innocence. Professors Bedau and Radelet do make several concessions. First, they admit that the evidence convincing them of innocence in some cases "may not convince others."127 Second, they admit that their decision to include "a few borderline cases may look to other investigators to be not only debatable but even incorrect."128 Third, they concede that "the cases form a continuum, from those where the evidence for inno cence is conclusive to those where the evidence is slight."129 126. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 112, at 24; see also id. at 38 (asserting that the defendants had been "proved to be innocent").
127. Id. at 47.
Id.
129. Id. at 47-48. They also concede that "[i]n none of these cases, however, can we point to the implication of another person or to the confession of the true killer, much Jess to any official action admitting the execution of an innocent person." Id. at 74.
In addition to these admitted defects, a significant problem with the Bedau-Radelet study is that it appears to give greater weight to potentially unreliable post-conviction statements than to the decisions of juries and trial judges that were upheld by appellate judges.13° The method of establishing innocence used by Professors Leo and Of she is questionable. To determine whether a confession is probably false and the defendant probably innocent, they examined the defendant's own post-admission narrative and looked for evidence corroborating the confession. This method of determining innocence is can be "highly subjective. "131 Despite these limitations, other researchers have incor rectly claimed that the Bedau-Radelet studies present "known" in stances of wrongful convictions of false confessors.132
C. Th e Value of Deception During Interrogation
Deceptive interrogation techniques have value. Deception is need e d to obtain some confessions, confessions are needed to obtain some convictions, and those convictions provide great value to society -specifically to existing victims, future potential victims, and inno cent persons who might have been wrongly charged absent a confes sion by the true perpetrator.133 The press bias may be to find an innocent person wrongly convicted, since it is not news that a guilty person is in prison.
132. See Alschuler, Constraint, supra note 10, at 973 n.78 ("For an indication of the fre quency of known false confessions (no more than the tip of the iceberg)," see the works of Professors White, Bedau and Radelet, Leo and Ofshe). Professor Alschuler, like others, has accepted the studies by Professors Leo and Ofshe, and Professors Bedau and Radelet, with out questioning what evidence there is of innocence. Professor Alschuler refers to these studies as concerning cases of "known" innocence, even though the researchers themselves concede that in many of their cases, the innocence is, at best, possible or probable, and there has been no judicial acknowledgement of the purportedly "known" innocence of the defen dant. See also Gregory W. O'Reilly, Comment on lngraham's "Moral Duty" To Ta lk and the Right to Silence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 539 (1997) (relying on Bedau and Radelet after asserting that "the innocent are convicted").
133. See Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1905 ("Deception and advantage taking are ... at the core of criminal investigation .... ").
Deception Is Needed to Obtain Some Confessions
In some instances, the police must use deception to obtain a con fession from a suspect.134 Relatively few suspects enter the interroga tion room and promptly offer a full and truthful confession of their wrongdoing. Confessions usually occur only after some form of decep tion by the officer, from hiding the officer's true feelings about the suspect or the nature of the crime to exaggerating the strength of the evidence. Officers use deception because experience has taught them that it works.135 Effective interrogations necessarily depend upon a single but significant lie -the "Big Lie." The Big Lie is that it is somehow in the suspect's best interest to confess. In reality, making an uncounseled confession to an officer is rarely in a suspect's best inter est.136 If an interrogator were truly honest, he would inform the sus pect that it is generally not in the suspect's best interest to make any 134. Professor lnbau, author of the leading police manual, has explained that "[i]n dealing with criminal offenders, and consequently also with criminal suspects who may actu ally be innocent, the interrogator must of necessity employ less refined methods than are considered appropriate for the transaction of ordinary, everyday affairs by and between law abiding citizens." lnbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 19. Inbau observes that con versation between officer and suspect during interrogation does not proceed as it would be tween two citizens in everyday life. Id. Interrogation is part of criminal investigation, not everyday life. There is no reason to require interrogation during an investigation to be any more genteel than a search and seizure during an investigation. For example, a person who seems to have lost an item does not upend a friend's house and search for it even if he has some suspicion that the friend accidentally or intentionally obtained the item. Yet the police, based on probable cause, may conduct a probing search of a home that will be fairly un pleasant for the homeowner.
135. In his observational study of almost 200 interrogations, Professor Leo found that it was commonplace for the police to confront the suspect with false evidence. He found that in 30% of the interrogations, the police confronted the suspect with false evidence of his guilt. See Richard A. Leo, Th e Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 623 (1996) .
Most commentators do not dispute the point that deception is necessary to obtain some confessions. See, e.g., White, Fa lse Confessions, supra note 10, at 111 (stating that "interroga tion is indispensable to law enforcement"). But see Paris, Lying, supra note 47, at 825 ("It is far from clear that the amount of information derived from interrogations would be signifi cantly reduced if police were required to tell the truth."). In fact, the arguments against de ception are based on the notion that deception is too effective, and that a confession is far more likely to be obtained when the interrogating officer uses some deception than when the officer is entirely truthful. Thus, some of the arguments against deception reflect a view that the police should simply get along with fewer confessions.
136. See DA YID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 213 (Ballantine Books 1993) ("The fraud that claims it is somehow in a suspect's interest to talk with police will forever be the catalyst in any criminal interrogation. It is a fiction propped up against the greater weight of logic itself .... "); H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 210 (1988) (" 'Anybody who stops and thinks about it has to know that he's hurting himself by admit ting to a crime ... .' " (quoting a police officer)); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1926 ("If suspects fully comprehended the nature and scope of their legal rights and the likely conse quences of relinquishing them, there would be very few police station confessions.").
statement at all.137 Such a completely honest interrogator would find confessions awfully scarce.
Confessions Are Needed to Obtain Many Convictions
a. Convictions Lost Because of the Absence of a Confession. Some cases can be successfully prosecuted only with a confession from the defendant. The state has an extremely high burden of proof. Without a statement from the defendant, the physical evidence and testimony from witnesses are sometimes insufficient to obtain a conviction.138 In other cases, there is little physical evidence, the defendant conceals his face, or there are no witnesses. Some of the most heinous crimes, such as child abuse, may involve no physical evidence and no witnesses, other than the child who may be incompetent to testify due to age. Obviously, the more clever and sophisticated the criminal is, the less likely he is to carelessly leave behind physical evidence or witnesses. Confessions will sometimes offer the only hope of convicting the guilty.139
b. Value of a Confession Even If Not Essential to Conviction. A confession may be extremely valuable in a case, even if not essential to a conviction. First, resolution of a case because of a confession allows the police to use their valuable and limited resources to investigate other crimes. Second, confessions greatly reduce the risk that police 137. In the overwhelming number of cases it is contrary to a suspect's self-interest to confess because a confession will increase the chance that the suspect will be convicted and a penalty will be imposed. But Justice Scalia has pointed out that the suspect may, in fact, achieve some rehabilitative benefit by confessing, rather than continuing to conceal, his wrong-doing. See (1974))). Given that the nation's prisons serve more punitive than rehabilitative goals, and that rehabilitation can also occur in a private setting outside of incarceration, confessing will usually impose greater costs than benefits on the defendant. Despite modern advances in the technology of crime detection, offenses frequently occur about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there cannot be found innocent human witnesses to such offenses, nothing remains -if police investigation is not to be balked before it has fa irly begun -but to seek out possibly guilty witnesses and ask them questions, witnesses, that is, who are suspected of knowing something about the offense pre cisely because they are suspected of implication in it.
See also Inbau, Police Interrogation, supra note 8, at 147 ("Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual or upon the basis of informa tion obtained from the questioning of other criminal suspects.").
139. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effe cts of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 905-15 (1999) (surveying fifty-nine prosecutors and finding that 61 % of confessions were deemed necessary to obtain a conviction; also finding that defendants who confessed were convicted in 78.9% of cases, while those questioned unsuccessfully were convicted in 49.3% of cases).
(Vol. 99:1168 suspicion will fall on an innocent person. If there is no confession from the true wrongdoer, there is a risk that an innocent person could be investigated, arrested, or even falsely convicted and incarcerated.140 Third, the existence of a confession may permit the prosecution to ob tain a suitable plea agreement. A confession may so strengthen the prosecution's case that a plea bargain to an inappropriate lesser of fense can be avoided. Guilty pleas free the courts to move quickly to resolve other cases, spare trauma to the victim, and avoid the financial drain on judicial and prosecutorial resources that would be consumed by a trial.
Value of Convictions Obtained Because of Confessions
Before considering the proposals to limit substantially various in terrogation techniques, it is necessary to consider the obvious benefits of resolving a criminal investigation with a conviction. First, the great est value to society is the incapacitation of the criminal. During the time that the offender is incarcerated, he is unable lo commit new crimes and victimize others. Many criminals commit far more crimes than the few for which they are arrested. Leaving a criminal at large imposes substantial risks on society. Second, if a criminal is not appre hended and convicted, the victim continues to suffer even after recov ering from the direct physical and financial injuries caused by the criminal. The victim's emotional recovery is less certain and takes far longer if the victim knows that the criminal remains at large. Both the victim's anxiety about suffering additional harm and the victim's un addressed desire for justice are significant costs incurred when the ab sence of a confession means that the perpetrator cannot be con victed.141
Finally, if the offender is not convicted, there is no opportunity for rehabilitation. A conviction allows the court not only to incarcerateand thereby incapacitate -the offender, but also to attempt to reha bilitate the offender with a wide variety of programs, including proba tionary and parole supervision, boot camp, drug and alcohol treat ment, educational opportunities, parenting programs, and counseling. Such supervision benefits the offender who may then be able to lead a rewarding life as a productive citizen. Society benefits, of course, when the offender is rehabilitated and, thus, is no longer a threat to the physical, emotional, and financial well-being of innocent persons. 
D. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Deception During Interrogation
Major policy changes, such as greatly limiting interrogation, should be implemented only after the costs and benefits of making a change have been adequately considered, properly weighed, and balanced against each other.
The False Confession Cost from Permitting Deception:
Numbers Do Matter
In assessing the cost of deceptive interrogation practices, in terms of wrongful convictions resulting from false confessions, numbers do matter. Laws that could affect nearly everyone in the country should not be based on a few compelling, even disturbing, anecdotes.142 The number of false confessors must be compared to the number of true confessors, and the number of false confessions we could avoid must be compared to the number of true confessions we would lose. Yet, commentators advocating substantial limits on interrogation tech niques have relied for support on anecdotal evidence of the false con fession problem. The presentation of anecdotal evidence on false con fessions may be sufficient to establish a need for additional, and more scientific, study of the matter, but anecdotal reports alone do not pro vide the evidence which is needed to properly weigh the costs and benefits of deception.
a. Problems with Basing Policy on Anecdotal Evidence. Anecdotes do have value. The recitation of anecdotes, which evoke an emotional response, can be persuasive evidence that a problem exists. "[A]necdotes can crystallize and mobilize public opinion on even the most dull and arcane subject. Unlike statistics, anecdotes offer sim plicity and transparency. Little specialized knowledge is necessary to become outraged by a bad anecdote or self-congratulatory about a good one."143 For some issues, the narrative in anecdotes "puts a hu man face on a particular problem, brings new voices to the table, makes plain unexamined assumptions and implicit bias, and can en hance the probability of a real solution by transforming the terms of discourse."144 But anecdotes alone cannot provide the basis for major [Vol. 99:1168 policy or legal changes.14s The anecdotes, which capture the attention of academics, the press, the public, or legislators, must be shown to be representative of a much larger group of such cases.
Anecdotes standing alone, however, provide no evidence on the frequency of the problem they illustrate. That is why "anecdotal evi dence is heavily discounted in most fields. "146 The persuasive power of an anecdote, especially a well-told anecdote, can obscure the limited role of anecdotes in proving that a problem is widespread, or in ana lyzing the problem. 150. In fact, the available evidence is that the defendants in the anecdotes are not typi cal of the great number of defendants who are subjected to interrogation and who give con fessions. The false confessors in the anecdotes appear to include a much larger percentage of juveniles and mentally impaired persons than is typical of criminal defendants in general. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 584; see also Richard A. Posner, Legal Nar ratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 742 (1997) ("The significance of a story of oppression de pends on its representativeness ... [T]o evaluate policies for dealing with the ugliness we must know its frequency, a question that is in the domain of social science rather than of nar rative.").
151. Leo would impose substantial costs on society, in terms of lost true confes sions, it is vitally important to know just how many false confessions will be avoided by the measures sought.
Although the use of deception is not a risk-free procedure, the magnitude of the risk must be considered before new limits are im posed. There is no doubt that the conviction of an innocent person be cause of a false confession is a great miscarriage of justice and a matter of enormous concern. The research presented to date does not estab lish that false confessions occur with such frequency that drastic meas ures are warranted. Commentators have highlighted only a few dozen false confession cases out of the pool of thousands, if not millions, of cases in this century in which a person made a confession and was convicted. 152 b. Statistically Valid Research on Fa lse Confessions Could Be Conducted. Commentators urging limits on interrogation techniques seem reluctant to conduct the kind of research necessary to justify these limits. For example, while presenting the false confession prob lem as significant, Professors Leo and Ofshe assert "that it is presently not possible to quantify the number and frequency of false confessions or the rate at which they lead to miscarriage of justice .... "153 Al though they correctly concede that such research has not been con ducted, their assertion that such research is "impossible" is not sound. 154 They assert that there "are at least three reasons why at present it is not possible to devise an empirical study to measure, quantify or es timate with any reasonable degree of certainty the incidence of police induced false confessions or the number of wrongful convictions they cause."155 They explain, first, that "American police typically do not record interrogations in their entirety."156 This fact does not present an insurmountable barrier to researching the frequency of false confes sions. Currently, two states and many other individual municipalities videotape confessions.157 Moreover, a researcher could arrange to ob-(Vol. 99:1168 serve a large sample of interrogations.158 These observed cases could then be tracked to determine if there is evidence that the confession was false and it resulted in a wrongful conviction.
The second objection to researching the frequency of false confes sions is that "because no criminal justice agency keeps records or col lects statistics on the number or frequency of interrogations in America, no one knows how often suspects are interrogated or how often they confess, whether truthfully or falsely."159 Even assuming that no such total number of confessions for the nation is readily available, the absence of such a number does not impede the research. Random samples could be observed in several representative areas such as large urban, suburban, and rural police departments.160
The third reason offered for the absence of research on the fre quency of false confessions is that "many cases of false confession are likely to go unreported and therefore unacknowledged and unno ticed" because "most confessors will be arrested, charged, prosecuted and/or convicted."161 The fact of conviction is certainly strong evidence that the confession was not false. But if there is other evidence that, despite the conviction, the confession was false, it is the admittedly dif ficult job of the researcher to find that evidence.162
158. In fact, Professor Leo has already relied on this approach by observing a sample, although not an entirely random one, of 182 cases in one jurisdiction. Professor Cassell un dertook a similar observational study. He, or his research colleague, observed 173 cases in Salt Lake City. See Cassell, Social Costs, supra note 101.
159. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1137.
160. In two studies that did not specifically look for false confessions, but that did ex amine samples of confession cases, the researchers did not report that any of the confessions were false. See Cassell, Guilty and "Innocent", supra note 10, at 529 (discussing Professor Leo's study of 182 interrogations in the San Francisco Bay area, and Professor Cassell's study of 173 interrogations in Salt Lake City).
A random sample survey of the actual number of confessions could be made an even more manageable project if only murder cases were examined. Limiting the research to murder cases makes sense because most of the anecdotal evidence on false confessions in volves homicide cases. See Leo 162. Professors Bedau and Radelet seem unwilling to acknowledge that better, more comprehensive research could be conducted and is necessary to support their argument about wrongful convictions. They claim that if their existing study "fails to convince the reader of the fallibility of human judgment then nothing will." Bedau & Radelet, supra note 112, at 24 (quoting G. SCOTI, THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 262 (1950)). Of course, no one doubted, even before their study, that some wrongful convictions do occur. The key question, and the one on which Professors Bedau and Radelet shed little light, is not whether they occur but how often they occur.
Professors Bedau and Radelet argue that they have already undertaken "a sustained and systematic attempt to identify as many cases as possible" of wrongful convictions. Id. at 27. There is no doubt that quite a bit work went into their study. Yet the glaring flaw in their research is that they did not conduct any kind of random survey. They chose their 350 cases from the entire body of cases decided this century throughout the country. A far more useful study would concentrate on a much smaller time frame and geographic area and attempt to identify the total number of wrongful convictions in that time and place. This would allow researchers to have some reasonable estimate of the percentage of wrongful convictions.
Th e Cost of Limiting Deception
The argument for broad limits on the use of deception should be evaluated only after considering the costs of imposing such limits. If such limits were imposed, true confessions would be lost either be cause officers complying with the restrictive limits would fail to elicit a confession, or because a confession would be suppressed if officers questioned a suspect in violation of the limits. Although the precise cost from losing true confessions cannot be specified, there is no doubt that it would be substantial. Given that there is no proof of an unac ceptably high rate or number of false confessions, there is no basis for imposing on society the large cost of lost true confessions in order to avoid the much smaller cost of false confessions.
The loss of true confessions, which translates into lost convictions, imposes substantial costs on both existing and potential victims. Un convicted criminals have the opportunity to commit additional crimes. In fact, a criminal who evades punishment for one crime is even more likely to commit additional crimes because he avoided being rehabili tated and did not experience any deterrence effect from conviction, sentencing, and incarceration. Moreover, in addition to the existing and future victims of crime, other innocent persons suffer from the loss of confessions and convictions when they are wrongly charged for crimes to which the actual wrongdoer has not confessed. 163 There would be great costs imposed on the criminal justice system if improper deception were defined to include anything that tends "to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confess ing."164 That is precisely what an interrogator must do if he expects to obtain a confession. A suspect who fully comprehends the conse quence of confessing will generally not give a full and truthful confes sion to an officer. If suspects were allowed fully to protect their selfThus far, Professors Leo and Ofshe, too, have demonstrated little interest in undertaking research on the actual number of false confessions. They have asserted that "it is far more important to study the conditions under which [false confessions] occur, the characteristics of such cases and why they led to deprivations of liberty and miscarriages of justice than it is to attempt to quantify" the number of false confessions. Leo & Ofshe, Missing the Forest, supra note 95, at 1139. They assert that it may not be "worth the effort and expense" to quantify the rate of false confessions because "there appears to be widespread agreement that false confessions and miscarriages of justice occur sufficiently often to warrant the con cern of legal scholars, jurists, and legislators." Id.
163. See Cassell, Protecting the Innocent, supra note 109, at 498 ("[T]ruthful confessions protect the innocent by helping the criminal justice system separate a guilty suspect from the possibly innocent ones, while the failure to obtain a truthful confession creates a risk of mis take."); Stuntz, Lawyers, supra note 80, at 1907 ("[G]uilty criminal defendants would benefit substantially if the law were to prohibit deceptive tactics, while innocents would probably be harmed by the impairment of the government's ability to sort cases.").
164. Grano, Selling the Idea, supra note 8, at 669 (citing FRED E. INBAU, ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 332 (3d ed. 1986)). See also supra note 9 for commentators who have urged a very broad definition of deception.
[Vol. 99:1168 interest during interrogation, then much of what successful interroga tors practice, "from insincere politeness to overt trickery, would have to be disallowed."165 As few suspects spontaneously give full and truth ful confessions, many confessions, and thus many convictions, would be lost if all deception were prohibited.
The Value of Deception Outweighs Its Costs
As shown above, no one has made a credible case that there is truly a substantial number of cases in which persons have been wrongly convicted based on false confessions induced by deceptive in terrogation techniques. On the other hand, the substantial value of de ception in obtaining confessions is based on long experience.166 Given the limited proof of the false confession problem, there is little ques tion that the benefit of deception outweighs its costs. Nevertheless, some commentators urge drastic limits on interrogation.
There are at least three possible explanations why some commen tators urge drastic limits on deceptive interrogation techniques on the basis of such limited evidence of false confessions. First, some com mentators may believe that the few cases they discovered are some how only the tip of the iceberg. Second, and more likely, these com mentators may believe that even a very small number of cases of false confessions is too high a price to pay for the continued use of decep tion. In reaching this conclusion, these commentators either fail to ap preciate or substantially undervalue the costs that would be imposed on society by drastically limiting deception. Third, the commentators who focus on the few documented cases of innocent persons convicted because of police-induced false confessions may also be interested in reducing the far greater number of confessions obtained from guilty persons. The absence of a confession will sometimes mean that there will be no conviction or that the case will be so much weaker that the guilty defendant will be offered a plea bargain and allowed to serve less time. There is a range of reasons why some commentators may prefer to have even guilty persons either not be convicted or serve less time. For example, they may believe that criminal penalties are gener ally too harsh, that prisons are overcrowded and violent, or that many 165. Grano, Selling the Idea , supra note 8, at 670. Academic critics of deception tend to ignore or downplay the enormous value in permitting deception during interrogation. See Grano, Criminal Procedure, supra note 56, at 714 ("When commentators make reference to crime control, they usually use such narrow terms as 'the police interest' or 'law enforcement goals.' Unlike the discussion of perceived police abuse, in which passion abounds, the pass ing references to the possibility of uncaught murderers and rapists are flat. It is the police rather than the criminals who are treated as aliens." (emphasis omitted) (quoting Caplan, supra note 58, at 1425 n.47 (1985))).
166. That is why defendants routinely and strenuously object, in motions to suppress and at trial, to the use of deception during interrogation.
guilty defendants turned to crime as a consequence of an underprivi leged upbringing, drug or alcohol use, or after difficult life experi ences. But placing limits on the use of deception, and thus reducing the number of convictions of guilty persons, is not the appropriate means of addressing these other valid concerns about how best to treat persons who are convicted of a crime.
4.
No Reason to Single Out Deception Out from Other Causes of Wrongful Conviction
The existing research has documented only a very small number of convictions caused by false confessions from police deception. Even if additional studies were to show more such cases, the very broad limi tations on interrogation would still not necessarily be warranted. In terrogation, like many other investigative tools in the criminal justice process, has the potential to result in some number of erroneous con victions. The argument has not been persuasively made, however, that interrogation should be singled out from other practices that also have the potential to cause erroneous convictions.
False confessions appear to be one of the least common reasons for an erroneous conviction. In fact, there is virtually universal agree ment that misidentifications by victims and eyewitnesses cause far more erroneous convictions than do false confessions. 167 Yet there are few limits on the ability of eyewitnesses to testify against a defendant. Procedures such as showups, lineups, and photo arrays all sometimes result in misidentifications and erroneous convictions. Although these procedures cannot be so suggestive as to make a identifications unreli able,168 the procedures that are permitted still result in some misidenti fications. These procedures are permitted, however, because they are (Vol. 99:1168 recognized as necessary if crimes are to be solved, and wrongdoers prosecuted.
V. THE L IMITING P RINCIPLES B EYOND R ELIABILITY ARE N ARROW
Although reliability is the primary basis for setting limits on inter rogation, there are additional reasons for setting some limits. But these additional reasons are few. Some of the additional reasons of fered by commentators simply collapse down to the reliability ration ale. For example, much of the objection to inappropriate "police methods" is best understood as an objection to methods with an unac ceptably high risk of causing a false confession.169 There may, however, be a small number of interrogation techniques that would violate due process without implicating reliability concerns. Professor Grano sug gested one such situation with a hypothetical concerning the use of a police officer who impersonates a chaplain to obtain a confession in the interrogation roomY0 Arguably, such a deception should be barred because it intrudes on society's fundamental value in religion. 171 The Court has suggested that a "shock the conscience" standard may be useful for determining when police deception during interro gation goes too far. The Court applied the shock the conscience stan dard when it considered police deception not towards a suspect, but towards the attorney for the suspect who was interrogated. In 1986, in Moran v. Burbine, the Court heard a claim that the police violated due process: 1) by failing to inform the defendant that an attorney, re tained by his sister, was trying to contact him; and, 2) by falsely telling the attorney that the suspect would not be questioned that day. The Court rejected the claim, finding that "egregious ... police deception might rise to a level of a due process violation,"172 but that the conduct in Moran "falls short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks sensi bilities of civilized society as to" violate due process. 173 Under a shock the conscience standard, techniques cannot be con sidered shocking simply because they are successful in convincing sus pects to give truthful confessions. The shock the conscience standard bars only those few techniques that, even though they do not involve the physical coercion clearly forbidden under the voluntariness test, and even though they do not implicate the concerns of the reliability rationale, nevertheless violate "canons fundamental to the 'traditions and conscience of our people.' "174 Although the hypothetical involv ing the imposter chaplain is not the only technique that shocks the conscience by violating a fundamental value, it is one of only a small group:11s
VI. C ONCLUSION: A DDITIONAL L IMITS ON D ECEPTION A RE U NWARRANTED
Interrogation techniques have changed little in the years since the Miranda Court itemized them, cast a disapproving look, but concluded that they were permissible as long as a valid waiver ·of rights was ob tained. The Dickerson Court affirmed the balance struck in Miranda, in which rights, warnings, and waivers protect suspects. But Miranda left (and Dickerson continues to leave) interrogators with a wide berth for obtaining truthful confessions. A compelling argument has not yet been made that drastic limits on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable. The non-reliability ration ales for such limits -such as equality, trust, and dignity -largely re flect the inappropriate view that certain interrogation techniques should be barred because they are too effective in ·obtaining confes sions. In fact, there is nothing wrong with obtaining a truthful confes sion of wrongdoing from a guilty person.
Reliability, however, is an appropriate concern. Interrogation techniques must be limited when they endanger reliability by creating a likelihood of producing a false confession. In advocating limits on deceptive techniques, however, some commentators have overstated the false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting inter rogation. The alarming claims of a widespread false confession prob lem have not yet been demonstrated with a statistically valid sample of confession cases. Thus far, the evidence of the false confession prob lem consists only of anecdotal reports. On the other hand, broad limits on deception could result in the loss of many thousands of confessions by guilty persons. Because there is insufficient proof of the scope of the false confession problem, the reliability rationale does not provide a basis, at least yet, for barring or greatly limiting deception during in terrogation. 175. If barring an officer from impersonating a chaplain is appropriate, should an officer also be barred from impersonating a physician? Beyond clearly fundamental values such as religion, it is far less clear which interests are so important outside of the interrogation room that they should not be impinged on by interrogation techniques.
[Vol. 99:1168 Moreover, ev e n if researchers provide additional empirical proof on the false confession problem, alternatives to drastic prohibitions on interrogation techniques should be considered. For example, there is widespread agreement among commentators that interrogations should be videotaped. At least some of the concerns raised about false confessions could be addressed by the use of videotaping, rather than by strictly limiting interrogation techniques. 176 There is no question that deceptive interrogation techniques can contribute to the unpleasantness that suspects, both guilty and inno cent, endure during interrogation. Nevertheless, once there is prob able cause to suspect a person of a crime, some level of discomfort is considered acceptable because of society's interest in investigating and solving crimes. Deceptive but nonthreatening interrogation will gen erally be no more unpleasant than the other intrusions deemed rea sonable after a showing of probable cause -such as having one's home thoroughly searched pursuant to a warrant, or being placed in a detention facility during post-arrest processing.177 The probable cause standard provides an appropriate threshold of protection from both the pressures of custodial interrogation and the unpleasantness of de ceptive interrogation techniques.
There is a growing view that reliability is the appropriate focus of the debate over the use of deceptive interrogation techniques. There should also be a greater acknowledgement that, before these tech niques are drastically limited, there must be statistically sound, empiri cal research to determine if there truly is a widespread problem with police-induced false confessions. In the meantime, we should let the police do their job of investigating crime, but we should also be alert to the possibility of that tragic case in which an innocent person has been wrongly convicted because of a police-induced false confession.
